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Implementing steady state efficiency in
overlapping generations economies with
environmental externalities
Nguyen Thang DAO and Julio DÁVILA
Abstract
We consider in this paper overlapping generations economies with pol-
lution resulting from both consumption and production. The competitive
equilibrium steady state is compared to the optimal steady state from
the social planner’s viewpoint. We show that any competitive equilib-
rium steady state whose capital-labor ratio exceeds the golden rule ratio
is dynamically inefficient. Moreover, the range of dynamically efficient
steady states capital ratios increases with the effectiveness of the envi-
ronment maintainance technology, and decreases for more polluting pro-
duction technologies. We characterize some tax and transfer policies that
decentralize as a competitive equilibrium outcome the social planner’s
steady state.
Resumé
On étudie dans ce papier des économies de générations imbriquées avec
pollution provenant aussi bien de la consommation que de la production.
L’état stationnaire d’équilibre concurrentiel est compare à l’état station-
naire optimal du point de vue du planificateur. On montre que lorsque le
ratio capital-travail excède à l’état stationnaire de l’équilibre concurrentiel
celui de la règle d’or, alors le premier est dynamiquement inefficace. De
plus, l’intervalle d’états stationnaires dynamiquement efficaces s’accroît
avec l’effectivité de la technologie de maintient de l’environnement, et
diminue lorsque la technologie de production est plus polluante. On carac-
térise des politiques fiscales qui décentralisent l’état stationnaire du plan-
ificateur comme équilibre concurrentiel.
Keywords: overlapping generations, environmental externality, tax
and transfer policy.
Mots clés: générations imbriquées, externalités environementales,
politiques fiscales.
JEL Classification: D62, E21, H21, H41
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1 Introduction
Environmental externalities in economies with overlapping gen-
erations have been studied since at least the 1990s. In particular,
the effects of environmental externalities on dynamic inefficiency,
productivity, health and longevity of agents have been addressed,
as well, as the policy interventions that may be needed. While in
most papers pollution is assumed to come from production, and the
environment is supposed to improve or degrade by itself at a con-
stant rate (Marini and Scaramozzino 1995; Jouvet et al 2000; Jouvet,
Pestieau and Ponthiere 2007; Pautrel 2007; Gutiérrez 2008), other
papers assume that pollution comes from consumption (John and
Pecchenino 1994; John et al. 1995; Ono 1996). As a consequence
of the differing assumptions, the effect of environmental externali-
ties on capital accumulation vary widely across papers. Specifically,
John et al. (1995) showed that when only consumption pollutes, the
economy accumulates less capital than that what would be optimal.
Conversely, Gutiérrez (2008) showed that when only production pol-
lutes, the economy accumulates instead more capital than the opti-
mal level. This is so because in John et al. (1995) agents pay taxes to
maintain environment when young, so that an increased pollution re-
duces their savings; however, in Gutiérrez (2008) pollution increases
health costs in old age, leading agents to save more to pay for them.
The difference seems therefore to come from when the taxes are paid
(when young or old) rather than from whether pollution comes from
production or consumption. Another main difference between John
et al. (1995) and Gutiérrez (2008) is their different assumptions
about the ability of environment to recover from pollution. John et
al. (1995) assumes that environment naturally degrades over time,
while Gutiérrez (2008) assumes that environment recovers naturally.
This paper aims at disentangling the effects of both production
and consumption on environment. Specifically, as in John et al.
(1994, 1995), we assume that the environment degrades naturally
over time at a constant rate and that young agents devote part of
their income to maintain it.1 In this setup, we characterize the range
1In John et al. (1994, 1995), only the consumption of old agents pollutes, young agents do
not consume. In Ono (1996), it is assumed that consumption of both young and old agents
degrade the environment but with a period lag. Here, we assume also that consumptions of
both old and young agents and production pollute without decay.
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of dynamically inefficient capital-labor ratios. Next, we introduce
taxes and transfer policies that decentralize the first-best steady
state as a competitive equilibrium steady state.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the model. Section 3 characterizes its competitive equilibria.
Section 4 presents the problem of the social planner, defines the effi-
cient allocation with and without discounting, and characterizes the
range of dynamically inefficient capital ratios (Proposition 1). The
competitive equilibrium steady state and the planner’s steady state
are compared in Section 5, where we introduce some tax and trans-
fer schemes that decentralize the planner’s steady state as market
outcome (from Proposition 2 to Proposition 9). Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 The model
We consider the overlapping generations economy in Diamond
(1965) with a constant population of identical agents. The size of
each generation is normalized to one. Each agent lives two peri-
ods, say young and old. When young, an agent is endowed with
one unit of labor which he supplies inelastically. Agents born in
period t divide their wage wt between consumption when young
ct0, investment in maintaining the environment mt, and savings kt
lent to firms to be used in t + 1 as capital for a return rate rt+1.
The return of savings rt+1kt is used up as old age consumption.
Agents born at date t have preferences over their consumptions when
young and old (ct0, ct1) ∈ R2+ and the environmental quality when old,
Et+1 ∈ R, represented by u(ct0) + v(ct1) +φ(Et+1) with u′, v′, φ′ > 0,
u′′, v′′, φ′′ < 0, and u′(0) = v′(0) = +∞, u′(+∞) = v′(+∞) = 0.
Environmental quality evolves according to
Et+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (Kt+1, Lt+1)− β(ct+10 + ct1) + γmt
for some α, β, γ > 0 and b ∈ (0, 1], where F is a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function F (Kt, Lt) = AKθt L
1−θ
t . Capital fully depreciates
in each period. Under perfect competition, the representative firm
maximizes profits solving
Max
Kt,Lt≥0
F (Kt, Lt)− rtKt − wtLt
3
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so that the wage rate and the rental rate of capital are, in each
period t, the marginal productivity of labor and capital respectively.
Since population is normalized to 1, period t aggregate savings (i.e.
period t + 1 aggregate capital Kt+1) and labor supply are kt and 1
respectively, and the wage and rental rate of capital faced by the
agent born at period t are
rt+1 = FK(k
t, 1) = θA(kt)θ−1 (1)
wt = FL(k
t−1, 1) = (1− θ)A(kt−1)θ (2)
Environmental quality converges autonomously to a natural level
normalized to zero at a rate b that measures the speed of reversion to
this level. Nonetheless, production and consumption degrade envi-
ronmental quality by an amount αF (Kt+1, 1) and β(ct+10 +ct1) respec-
tively, while young agents can improve the environmental quality by
an amount γmt if they devote a portion mt of their income to that
end.2
The life-time utility maximization problem of the representative
agent is
Max
ct0,c
t
1,k
t,mt≥0
Et,E
e
t+1
u(ct0) + v(c
t
1) + φ(E
e
t+1) (3)
subject to
ct0 + k
t +mt = wt (4)
ct1 = rt+1k
t (5)
Et = (1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− β(ct0 + ct−11 ) + γmt−1 (6)
2One can thus interpret environmental quality as including any characteristic that make
the environment more apt for human life, like the cleanness of rivers and atmosphere, and
the quality of soil or groundwater, etc. It also includes the state of forests, agricultural lands,
parks and gardens, which left on their own naturally revert to wilderness, unless subject to
regular maintenance.
4
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Eet+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (Kt+1, 1)− β(ct+1,e0 + ct1) + γmt (7)
given Et−1, ct−11 , kt−1, mt−1, wt, rt+1 as well as the expected con-
sumption of the next generation young agent ct+1,e0 . Since the pre-
sentative agent is assumed to be negligible within his own genera-
tion, he thinks of the impact of his savings kt on aggregate capital
Kt+1 to be negligible as well, ignoring that actually Kt+1 = kt at
equilibrium. This assumption implies that he does not internalize
the impact of the savings decision on environment via production.
Agent t’s optimal choice (ct0, ct1, kt,mt, Et, Eet+1) is therefore char-
acterized by the first-order conditions
u′(ct0)− [β(1− b) + γ]φ′(Eet+1) = 0 (8)
v′(ct1)−
[
β +
γ
rt+1
]
φ′(Eet+1) = 0 (9)
ct0 + k
t +mt − wt = 0 (10)
ct1 − rt+1kt = 0 (11)
Et − (1− b)Et−1 + αF (kt−1, 1) + β(ct0 + ct−11 )− γmt−1 = 0 (12)
Eet+1 − (1− b)Et + αF (Kt+1, 1) + β(ct+1,e0 + ct1)− γmt = 0 (13)
as an implicit function of Et−1, ct−11 , kt−1, mt−1, wt, rt+1 and c
t+1,e
0 as
long as the Jacobian matrix of the left-hand-side of the system above
with respect to ct0, ct1, kt, mt, Et, Eet+1 is regular at the solution. The
existence of the optimal solution is established in Appendix A1 and
the regularity of the Jacobian matrix at equilibrium is established
in Appendix A2. For these FOCs to be not only necessary but
also sufficient for the solution to be a maximum, the second order
conditions (SOCs) are shown to hold at equilibrium in Appendix
A3.
5
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3 Competitive equilibria
Perfect foresight competitive equilibria are characterized by (i)
the agent’s utility maximization under the budget constraints, with
correct expectations, (ii) the firms’ profit maximization determining
factors’ prices, and (iii) the dynamics of environment. Therefore, a
competitive equilibrium allocation {ct0, ct1, kt, mt, Et+1}t is solution
to the system of equations
u′(ct0)− [β(1− b) + γ]φ′(Et+1) = 0 (14)
v′(ct1)−
[
β +
γ
FK(kt, 1)
]
φ′(Et+1) = 0 (15)
ct0 + k
t +mt − FL(kt−1, 1) = 0 (16)
ct1 − FK(kt, 1)kt = 0 (17)
Et+1 − (1− b)Et + αF (kt, 1) + β(ct+10 + ct1)− γmt = 0 (18)
Note that the feasibility of the allocation of resources is guaranteed
by the agent’s budget constraints (16) and (17), since at t
ct0 + c
t−1
1 + k
t +mt = FK(k
t−1, 1)kt−1 + FL(kt−1, 1) = F (kt−1, 1)
A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium steady state, in partic-
ular, is a (c0, c1, k, m, E) solution to the system of equations
u′(c0)− [β(1− b) + γ]φ′(E) = 0
v′(c1)−
[
β +
γ
FK(k, 1)
]
φ′(E) = 0
c0 + k +m− FL(k, 1) = 0
c1 − FK(k, 1)k = 0
bE + αF (k, 1) + β(c0 + c1)− γm = 0
6
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The perfect foresight competitive equilibria of this economy follow a
dynamics represented by a first-order difference equation, because of
the regularity of the associated Jacobian matrix of the left hand side
of the system of equations above with respect to ct+10 , ct1, kt, mt, Et+1
(see Appendix A1).
4 The social planner’s choice with and without dis-
counting
In this section, we consider the optimal allocation from the view-
point of a social planner that allocates resources in order to maxi-
mize a weighted sum of the welfare of all current and future genera-
tions. The allocation selected by the social planner, which is optimal
in the Pareto sense, is a solution to the problem
Max
{ct0,ct1,kt,mt,Et+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
1
(1 +R)t
[
u(ct0) + v(c
t
1) + φ(Et+1)
]
(19)
subject to, ∀t = 0, 1, 2, ...,
ct0 + c
t−1
1 + k
t +mt = F (kt−1, 1) (20)
Et+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (kt−1, 1)− β(ct+10 + ct1) + γmt (21)
given some initial conditions c−11 , k−1, E0, where 0 ≤ R is the so-
cial planner’s subjective discount rate.3 The first constraint (20) of
the problem is the resource constraint of the economy in period t
requiring that the total output in that period is split into consump-
tions of the current young and old, savings for next period’s capital,
and environmental maintenance. The second constraint (21) is the
dynamics of the environmental quality.
The social planner’s choice of a steady state is a (c¯0, c¯1, m¯, k¯, E¯)
satisfying (see Appendix A4)
3The discount rate R is strictly positive when the social planner cares less about a gener-
ation’s welfare the further away in the future that generation is, while R equals to zero when
she cares about all generations equally, no matter how far in the fuure they may be.
7
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u′(c¯0) = (1 +R)
γ + β(1 +R)
b+R
φ′(E¯) (22)
v′(c¯1) =
γ + β(1 +R)
b+R
φ′(E¯) (23)
FK(k¯, 1) =
γ(1 +R)
γ − (1 +R)α (24)
c¯0 + c¯1 + k¯ + m¯ = F (k¯, 1) (25)
bE¯ + αF (k¯, 1) + β(c¯0 + c¯1)− γm¯ = 0 (26)
(the planner’s discount rate R cannot be arbitrarily high for the
optimal steady state to be characterized as above, specifically γ >
(1+R)α needs to hold, which requires γ > α, so that FK(k¯, 1) > 0).
More specifically, in the case of the social planner caring about all
generations equally, i.e. R = 0, the planer’s steady state is the so-
called golden rule steady state {c∗0, c∗1, k∗,m∗, E∗} that maximizes
the utility of the representative agent and is characterized by being
a solution to the system
u′(c∗0) =
γ + β
b
φ′(E∗) (27)
v′(c∗1) =
γ + β
b
φ′(E∗) (28)
FK(k
∗, 1) =
γ
γ − α (29)
c∗0 + c
∗
1 + k
∗ +m∗ = F (k∗, 1) (30)
bE∗ + αF (k∗, 1) + β(c∗0 + c
∗
1)− γm∗ = 0 (31)
Note that, from (27) and (28), the marginal utility of consumption
of the young agent must equal that of the consumption of the old
agent.
Diamond (1965) shows that in the standard OLG model without
pollution externalities, a competitive equilibrium steady state whose
8
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capital per worker exceeds the golden rule level is dynamically in-
efficient. Notwithstanding, Gutiérrez (2008) shows that, when the
pollution externality is large enough, there are dynamically efficient
competitive equilibrium steady state capital ratios that exceed the
golden rule capital ratio. Specifically, Gutiérrez (2008) shows the
existence of a “super golden rule” level of capital ratio, beyond the
golden rule level, such that any economy with pollution external-
ities whose stationary capital ratio exceeds this level is necessar-
ily dynamically inefficient. Nonetheless, it should be noted that in
Gutiérrez (2008) (i) pollution externalities only from production are
taken into account; (ii) the environment recovers itself overtime at
a constant rate; (iii) no resource is devoted to maintaining the en-
vironment; and (iv) the pollution externality decreases the utility
of the agents only indirectly by requiring each agent to pay for ex-
tra health costs in the old age. In this paper, we consider instead
an economy with pollution externalities coming from both produc-
tion and consumption, in which the environment degrades itself over
time, and the quality of the environment can be improved through
maintenance. Also the quality of environment directly affects the
utility of the agents. As a consequence, this paper shows instead
that, as in Diamond (1965) and in contrast with Gutiérrez (2008),
in an economy with consumption and production pollution external-
ities, the golden rule capital ratio is still the highest level of capital
ratio that is dynamically efficient.
Proposition 1: In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations econ-
omy with consumption and production pollution, for an efficient
enough cleaning technology, compared to the marginal polluting im-
pact of production (specifically, for γ > α in the model), the golden
rule (i.e. the planner’s steady state choice without discounting) is
the highest dynamically efficient capital ratio.
Proof: Since FKK(k, 1) < 0 for all k, the planner’s optimal capital
ratio k¯ is implicitly defined to be a differentiable function k¯(R) of R
by the condition
FK(k¯, 1) =
γ(1 +R)
γ − (1 +R)α
9
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whose derivative, by the implicit function theorem, is
k¯′(R) =
1
FKK(k¯(R), 1)
(
γ
γ − (1 +R)α
)2
< 0 (32)
So, k¯ is decreasing in R. Hence, k¯(R) is maximal when R = 0, which
is corresponds to the golden rule level of capital k∗
Proposition 1 shows that any steady state capital ratio exceed-
ing k∗ is dynamically inefficient. From (29) the golden rule capital
ratio k∗ is decreasing in the production pollution parameter α. It
is, however, increasing in the environment maintaining technology
γ. Hence, the more polluting is production, the smaller the range
of steady state allocations that are dynamically efficient for some
discount factor R. Similarly, the more effective is the environment
maintainance technology, the bigger the range of steady state allo-
cations that are dynamically efficient for some discount factor R.
5 Policy implementation of the planner’s optimal
steady state
In this section, we provide tax and transfer policies allowing to im-
plement the planner’s optimal steady state. Ono (1996) and Gutiér-
rez (2008) introduced also tax and transfer schemes to decentralize
the golden rule steady state in the context of the pollution exter-
nalities they consider (from consumption and production only, re-
spectively). However, their schemes uphold the golden rule once the
economy is already at that steady state. Nevertheless, in this sec-
tion we provide policies that lead the economy towards the social
planer’s steady state and will keep it there once reached (for the
golden rule, the social planner’s discount rate just needs to be set to
R = 0). The policies fulfill this in two stages. In the first stage, in
the period t, taxes and transfers are set in order to make the agent
born in period t choose his savings and consumption when old to be
equal to the optimal steady state capital ratio and optimal steady
state old agent’s consumption, respectively, from the viewpoint of
the social planner. Then in the second stage, taxes and transfers are
reset to uphold the planner’s steady state. The first scheme based
on the taxation of consumption is presented next in detail. The
subsequent schemes work analogously.
10
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5.1. Taxes on consumptions
Suppose that, at the begining of period t, the social planner an-
nounces proportional taxes and lump-sum transfers. Letting τ t0 and
τ t1 be the tax rate on agent t’s consumption when young and old
respectively, T t0 a lump-sum tax (if positive) levied on agent t’s in-
come when young, and T t1 a lump-sum transfer (if positive) to the
same agent when old at date t+ 1, the problem of agent t is then
Max
ct0,c
t
1,k
t,mt≥0
Et,E
e
t+1
u(ct0) + v(c
t
1) + φ(E
e
t+1) (33)
subject to
(1 + τ t0)c
t
0 + k
t +mt = wt − T t0 (34)
(1 + τ t1)c
t
1 = rt+1k
t + T t1 (35)
Et = (1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− β(ct0 + ct−11 ) + γmt−1 (36)
Eet+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (Kt+1, 1)− β(ct+1,e0 + ct1) + γmt (37)
given ct−11 , kt−1, mt−1, Et−1, wt, rt+1 and c
t+1,e
0 . Note again that
in equation (37), the agent, being negligible within his generation,
ignores the fact thatKt+1 = kt and hence is unable to internalize the
effect of the savings decisions on environment through the aggregate
output. Hence, the first-order conditions characterizing agent t’s
optimal choice are
u′(ct0) =
[
β(1− b) + γ(1 + τ t0)
]
φ′(Eet+1) (38)
v′(ct1) =
[
β +
γ(1 + τ t1)
FK(kt, 1)
]
φ′(Eet+1) (39)
(1 + τ t0)c
t
0 + k
t +mt = wt − T t0 (40)
(1 + τ t1)c
t
1 = rt+1k
t + T t1 (41)
11
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Et = (1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− β(ct0 + ct−11 ) + γmt−1 (42)
Eet+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (Kt+1, 1)− β(ct+1,e0 + ct1) + γmt (43)
At a perfect foresight equilibrium the wage rate and capital return
are given by the labor and capital productivities respectively, and
forecasts coincide with actual values, i.e. Eet+1 = Et+1 and c
t+1,e
0 =
ct+10 .
The next proposition shows that the tax rates and lump-sum
transfers can be set at levels that make agent t choose the planner’s
steady state capital ratio and consumption when old.
Proposition 2: In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations
economy with pollution from both consumption and production, for
any given period t, there exists a period by period budget balanced pol-
icy of consumption taxes, and lump-sum taxes and transfers, (τ t0, τ t1, T t0, T t1),
that implements at t + 1 the planner’s steady state capital ratio k¯
and consumption when old c¯1 at a competitive equilibrium.
Proof: Let the tax rates be
τ0 =
[γ + β(1 +R)](1 +R)− [γ + β(1− b)](b+R)
(b+R)γ
> 0
τ1 =
1 +R
b+R
· γ + β(1− b)
γ − α(1 +R) − 1 > 0
then equations (38), (39) become equations (22), (23) when the
equation (24) characterizing the planner’s steady state capital ratio,
FK(k¯, 1) =
1+R
1−(1+R)α/γ , holds. Therefore agent t’s chooses ice the
planner’s steady state capital ratio k¯ and consumption when old c¯1
under the consumption tax rates τ0, τ1 above if, and only if,
u′(ct0) = (1 +R)
γ + β(1 +R)
b+R
φ′(Et+1) (44)
v′(c¯1) =
γ + β(1 +R)
b+R
φ′(Et+1) (45)
12
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(1 + τ0)c
t
0 + k¯ +m
t = FL(k
t−1, 1)− T t0 (46)
(1 + τ1)c¯1 = FK(k¯, 1)k¯ + T
t
1 (47)
Et = (1−b)Et−1−αF (kt−1, 1)−β(ct0+ct−11 +τ0ct0+T t0)+γmt−1 (48)
Et+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (k¯, 1)− β(ct+10 + c¯1) + γmt (49)
given Et−1, ct−11 , kt−1, mt−1, c
t+1
0 = c
t+1,e
0 . Note that this is a system
in {ct0, T t0, T t1,mt, Et, Et+1} (note also that in the equation (48) the
consumption when old of agent t− 1 is now c˜t−11 = ct−11 + τ0ct0 + T t0
since he receives as a lump-sum transfer the tax raised from the
young agent t, τ0ct0+T t0, so that the government’s budget is balanced.
The solution in {ct0, T t0, T t1,mt, Et, Et+1} to the system of equa-
tions (44)-(49) is the following. Given that φ′′ < 0, from (45) and
(23)
v′(c¯1) =
γ+β(1+R)
b+R
φ′(Et+1)
v′(c¯1) =
γ+β(1+R)
b+R
φ′(E¯)
⇒ Et+1 = E¯
then from (44), (22) and Et+1 = E¯,
u′(ct0) = (1 +R)
γ+β(1+R)
b+R
φ′(Et+1)
u′(c¯0) = (1 +R)
γ+β(1+R)
b+R
φ′(E¯)
Et+1 = E¯
⇒ ct0 = c¯0
Also from (47) it follows
T t1 = (1 + τ1)c¯1 − FK(k¯, 1)k¯
and from (46) and ct0 = c¯0 we have
mt = FL(k
t−1, 1)− (1 + τ0)c¯0 − k¯ − T t0
It can also be easily checked that, substituting Et+1 = E¯, ct0 = c¯0,
mt = FL(k
t−1, 1)−(1+τ0)c¯0−k¯−T t0 and equation (48) into equation
(49) we have
E¯ = I − [β(1− b) + γ]T t0
13
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where
I = (1− b) [(1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− βct−11 + γmt−1]− αF (k¯, 1)
− [β(1− b) + γ] (1 + τ0)c¯0 − β(ct+10 + c¯1) + γ
[
FL(k
t−1, 1)− k¯]
so that
T t0 =
I − E¯
β(1− b) + γ
and hence, from equation (48),
Et = (1−b)Et−1−αF (kt−1, 1)−β(ct−11 +(1+τ0)c¯0+
I − E¯
β(1− b) + γ )+γm
t−1
(50)
Therefore, the solution to the system of equations (44)-(49) is
0BBBBBB@
ct0
T t0
T t1
mt
Et
Et+1
1CCCCCCA =
0BBBBBBB@
c¯0
I−E¯
β(1−b)+γ
(1 + τ1)c¯1 − FK(k¯, 1)k¯
FL(k
t−1, 1)− (1 + τ0)c¯0 − k¯ − I−E¯β(1−b)+γ
(1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− β(ct−11 + (1 + τ0)c¯0 + I−E¯β(1−b)+γ ) + γmt−1
E¯
1CCCCCCCA
so that under the policy (τ0, τ1, T t0, T t1) agent t’s chooses ice the plan-
ner’s steady state capital ratio k¯ and consumption when old c¯1. 
The next proposition shows that there exist lump-sum transfers
T t+10 , T
t+1
1 that make agent t + 1 choose, under the same tax rates
τ0, τ1, the planner’s steady state
{
c¯0, c¯01 , k¯, m¯, E¯, E¯
}
.
Proposition 3: In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations econ-
omy with pollution from both consumption and production the policy
(τ0, τ1, T0, T1) such that
τ0 =
[γ + β(1 +R)](1 +R)− [γ + β(1− b)](b+R)
(b+R)γ
> 0 (51)
τ1 =
1 +R
b+R
· γ + β(1− b)
γ − α(1 +R) − 1 > 0 (52)
T0 = FL(k¯, 1)− (1 + τ¯0)c¯0 − k¯ − m¯ (53)
14
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T1 = (1 + τ1)c¯1 − FK(k¯, 1)k¯ (54)
implements at t + 1 the planner’s steady state, after the first stage
of taxation in period t, and keeps the government budget balanced.
Proof: Given Et, ct1 = c¯1, kt = k¯, mt, c
t+2
0 = c
t+2,e
0 and the plan-
ner’s steady state capital ratio, k¯, the planner’s steady state con-
sumption of the old, c¯1, and the consumption tax rates τ0, τ1, then at
the perfect foresight equilibrium,
{
ct+10 , T
t+1
0 , T
t+1
1 ,m
t+1, Et+1, Et+2
}
is characterized by the following system of equation
Agent t + 1 will also choose the planner’s capital ratio and con-
sumption when old under a policy (τ0, τ1, T t+10 , T
t+1
1 ) -with the same
tax rates as before- if
u′(ct+10 ) = (1 +R)
γ + β(1 +R)
b+R
φ′(Eet+2) (55)
v′(c¯1) =
γ + β(1 +R)
b+R
φ′(Eet+2) (56)
(1 + τ0)c
t+1
0 + k¯ +m
t+1 = FL(k¯, 1)− T t+10 (57)
(1 + τ1)c¯1 = FK(k¯, 1)k¯ + T
t+1
1 (58)
Et+1(= E¯) = (1− b)Et − αF (k¯, 1)− β(ct+10 + c¯1) + γmt (59)
Eet+2 = (1− b)E¯ − αF (k¯, 1)− β(ct+20 + c¯1) + γmt+1 (60)
The solution in
{
ct+10 , T
t+1
0 , T
t+1
1 ,m
t+1, Et+1, E
e
t+2
}
to this system is
the following. Given that φ′′ < 0, from (56) and (23) it follows
v′(c¯1) =
γ+β(1+R)
b+R
φ′(Eet+2)
v′(c¯1) =
γ+β(1+R)
b+R
φ′(E¯)
⇒ Eet+2 = E¯
From (55), (22) and Et+2 = E¯
u′(ct+10 ) = (1 +R)
γ+β(1+R)
b+R
φ′(Eet+2)
u′(c¯0) = (1 +R)
γ+β(1+R)
b+R
φ′(E¯)
Eet+2 = E¯
⇒ ct+10 = c¯0
15
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At a perfect foresight equilibrium, ct+2,e0 = c
t+2
0 = c¯0 holds. Substi-
tuting ct+20 = c¯0 and Et+2 = E¯ into equation (60) and comparing
with equation (26) we have
{
bE¯ + αF (k¯, 1) + β(c¯0 + c¯1)− γmt+1 = 0
bE¯ + αF (k¯, 1) + β(c¯0 + c¯1)− γm¯ = 0
⇒ mt+1 = m¯
Substituting ct+10 = c¯0 and mt+1 = m¯ into (57) we have
T t+10 = FL(k¯, 1)− (1 + τ0)c¯0 − k¯ − m¯ = T0
Equation (58) gives us
T t+11 = (1 + τ1)c¯1 − FK(k¯, 1)k¯ = T1
So, by implementing the taxes and transfers policy, (τ0, τ1, T0, T1),
the optimal choice of agent born at date t+ 1 will coincide with the
planner’s optimal steady state.
We know the old agent in period t + 1 also receives a transfer
T1 = (1 + τ1)c¯1 − FK(k¯, 1)k¯. It is obvious that
T1 = τ0c¯0 + τ1c¯1 + T0
So, at such steady state, under this taxes and transfers policy,
the government budget is kept balanced every period. 
5.2. Taxes on consumptions and capital income
In the section 5.1, we introduced taxes on consumptions in which
the tax rates differ between consumptions of the old and the young.
In the reality, however, this tax scheme seems to be difficult to apply
because it may violate the equity among generations. In order to
avoid the discrimination between the old and the young, a unique
rate of consumption tax τ t should be applied. Beside that, a capital
income tax τ tk and a system of lump-sum tax T t0 (if positive) and
lump-sum transfer T t1 (if positive), levied on agent t’s incomes, are
introduced to show that the best steady state allocation can be
achieved. The problem of agent t is then
Max
ct0,c
t
1,k
t,mt≥0
Et,E
e
t+1
u(ct0) + v(c
t
1) + φ(E
e
t+1) (61)
16
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subject to
(1 + τ t)ct0 + k
t +mt = wt − T t0 (62)
(1 + τ t)ct1 = (1− τ tk)rt+1kt + T t1 (63)
Et = (1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− β(ct0 + ct−11 ) + γmt−1 (64)
Eet+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (Kt+1, 1)− β(ct+1,e0 + ct1) + γmt (65)
given Et−1, ct−11 , kt−1, mt−1, wt, c
t+1,e
0 and rt+1. Note again that
in equation (65), the agent, being negligible within his generation,
ignores the fact thatKt+1 = kt and hence is unable to internalize the
effect of the savings decisions on environment through the aggregate
output. Hence, the first-order conditions characterizing agent t’s
optimal choice are
u′(ct0) =
[
β(1− b) + γ(1 + τ t)]φ′(Eet+1) (66)
v′(ct1) =
[
β +
γ(1 + τ t)
(1− τ tk)FK(kt, 1)
]
φ′(Eet+1) (67)
(1 + τ t)ct0 + k
t +mt = wt − T t0 (68)
(1 + τ t)ct1 = (1− τ tk)rt+1kt + T t1 (69)
Et = (1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− β(ct0 + ct−11 ) + γmt−1 (70)
Eet+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (Kt+1, 1)− β(ct+1,e0 + ct1) + γmt (71)
At a perfect foresight equilibrium the wage rate and capital return
are given by the labor and capital productivities respectively, and
forecasts coincide with actual values, i.e. Eet+1 = Et+1 and c
t+1,e
0 =
ct+10 .
17
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Proposition 4: In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations
economy with pollution from both consumption and production, in
any period t, there exists a period by period budget balanced policy of
consumption tax, capital income tax and lump-sum taxes and trans-
fers, (τ t, τ tk, T t0, T t1), that supports to attain the planner’s steady state
capital (saving) ratio, k¯, and the planner’s steady state consumption
of the old, c¯1, at the competitive equilibrium.
Proof : The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for
proposition 2. 
Proposition 5: In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations
economy with pollution from both consumption and production, af-
ter finishing period t (the first stage of taxation), the economy can
achieve the planner’s steady state from period t + 1 onward by im-
plementing the following combination
τ =
[γ + β(1 +R)](1 +R)− [γ + β(1− b)](b+R)
(b+R)γ
> 0
τk = 1− (b+R)(γ − (1 +R)α)(1 + τ)
(1 +R)(γ + β − βb)
T0 = FL(k¯, 1)− (1 + τ)c¯0 − k¯ − m¯
T1 = (1 + τ)c¯1 − (1− τk)FK(k¯, 1)k¯
At such the steady state the goverment’s budget is kept balanced
every period.
Proof: The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for
proposition 3. 
5.3. Taxes on consumptions and production
We still keep the non-discriminatory tax rate τ t on consumptions
and the system of lump-sum tax T t0 (if positive) and lump-sum trans-
fer T t1 (if positive). However, we now introduce a Pigouvian tax on
production instead of tax on capital income. In any period, let τp
be the tax paid by firms per one unit of output produced. We will
18
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design taxes and transfers policy ensuring the government’s budget
to be balanced and achieving the planner’s steady state through
competitive markets.
Under the production tax, the problem that the firm much solve
is
Max
Kt
(1− τp)F (Kt, 1)− rtkt − wt (72)
The return of capital and the return of labor at the equilibrium
are
rt = (1− τp)FK(kt−1, 1) (73)
wt = (1− τp)FL(kt−1, 1) (74)
Under the taxes and transfers policy, the agent t’s problem is
Max
ct0,c
t
1,k
t,mt≥0
Et,Et+1
u(ct0) + v(c
t
1) + φ(E
e
t+1) (75)
subject to
(1 + τ t)ct0 + k
t +mt = wt − T t0 (76)
(1 + τ t)ct1 = rt+1k
t + T t1 (77)
Et = (1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt, 1)− β(ct0 + ct−11 ) + γmt−1 (78)
Eet+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (Kt+1, 1)− β(ct+1,e0 + ct1) + γmt (79)
given Et−1, ct−11 , kt−1, mt−1, wt, c
t+1,e
0 and rt+1. Note again that
in equation (79), the agent, being negligible within his generation,
ignores the fact thatKt+1 = kt and hence is unable to internalize the
effect of the savings decisions on environment through the aggregate
output. Hence, the first-order conditions characterizing agent t’s
optimal choice are
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u′(ct0) =
[
β(1− b) + γ(1 + τ t)]φ′(Eet+1) (80)
v′(ct1) =
[
β +
γ(1 + τ t)
(1− τ tp)FK(kt, 1)
]
φ′(Eet+1) (81)
(1 + τ t)ct0 + k
t +mt = wt − T t0 (82)
(1 + τ t)ct1 = (1− τ tp)rt+1kt + T t1 (83)
Et = (1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− β(ct0 + ct−11 ) + γmt−1 (84)
Eet+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (Kt+1, 1)− β(ct+1,e0 + ct1) + γmt (85)
At a perfect foresight equilibrium the wage rate and capital return
are given by the labor and capital productivities respectively, and
forecasts coincide with actual values, i.e. Eet+1 = Et+1 and c
t+1,e
0 =
ct+10 .
Proposition 6: In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations
economy with pollution from both consumption and production, in
any period t, there exists a period by period budget balanced policy
of consumption tax, production tax, lump-sum taxes and transfers,
(τ t, τ tp, T
t
0, T
t
1), that supports to attain the planner’s steady state cap-
ital (saving) ratio, k¯, and the planner’s steady state consumption of
the old, c¯1, at the competitive equilibrium.
Proof: The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for
proposition 2. 
Proposition 7: In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations
economy with pollution from both consumption and production, af-
ter finishing period t (the first stage of taxation), the economy can
achieve the planner’s steady state from period t + 1 onward by im-
plementing the following combination
τ =
[γ + β(1 +R)](1 +R)− [γ + β(1− b)](b+R)
(b+R)γ
> 0
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τp = 1− (b+R)(γ − (1 +R)α)(1 + τ)
(1 +R)(γ + β − βb)
T0 = FL(k¯, 1)− (1 + τ)c¯0 − k¯ − m¯
T1 = (1 + τ)c¯1 − (1− τp)FK(k¯, 1)k¯
At such the steady state the goverment’s budget is kept balanced
every period.
Proof: The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for
proposition 3. 
5.4. Taxes on consumption, production and labor income
We now modify the tax and transfer policy introduced in section
5.3 by using the labor income tax rate τ tw to replace the lump-sum
tax T t0 on wage. All other things are kept the same as in the section
5.3. Under this policy, the agent t’s problem is
Max
ct0,c
t
1,k
t,mt≥0
Et,Et+1
u(ctt) + v(c
t
t+1) + φ(Et+1) (86)
subject to
(1 + τc)c
t
0 + k
t +mt = (1− τ tw)wt (87)
(1 + τ)ct1 = rt+1k
t + T t0 (88)
Et = (1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− β(ct0 + ct−11 ) + γmt−1 (89)
Eet+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (Kt+1, 1)− β(ct+1,e0 + ct1) + γmt (90)
given Et−1, ct−11 , kt−1, mt−1, wt, c
t+1,e
0 and rt+1. Note again that
in equation (90), the agent, being negligible within his generation,
ignores the fact thatKt+1 = kt and hence is unable to internalize the
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effect of the savings decisions on environment through the aggregate
output. Hence, the first-order conditions characterizing agent t’s
optimal choice are
u′(ct0) =
[
β(1− b) + γ(1 + τ t)]φ′(Eet+1) (91)
v′(ct1) =
[
β +
γ(1 + τ t)
(1− τ tp)FK(kt, 1)
]
φ′(Eet+1) (92)
(1 + τ t)ct0 + k
t +mt = (1− τ tw)wt (93)
(1 + τ t)ct1 = (1− τ tp)rt+1kt + T t1 (94)
Et = (1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− β(ct0 + ct−11 ) + γmt−1 (95)
Eet+1 = (1− b)Et − αF (Kt+1, 1)− β(ct+1,e0 + ct1) + γmt (96)
At a perfect foresight equilibrium the wage rate and capital return
are given by the labor and capital productivities respectively, and
forecasts coincide with actual values, i.e. Eet+1 = Et+1 and c
t+1,e
0 =
ct+10 .
Proposition 8: In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations
economy with pollution from both consumption and production, in
any period t, there exists a period by period budget balanced policy
of consumption tax, production tax, lump-sum taxes and transfers,
(τ t, τ tp, τ
t
w, T
t
1), that supports to attain the planner’s steady state cap-
ital (saving) ratio, k¯, and the planner’s steady state consumption of
the old, c¯1, at the competitive equilibrium.
Proof: The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for
proposition 2. 
Proposition 9: In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations
economy with pollution from both consumption and production, af-
ter finishing period t (the first stage of taxation), the economy can
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achieve the planner’s steady state from period t + 1 onward by im-
plementing the following combination
τ =
β + (1− b)(γ − βb) + βR(1 + b+R)
(b+R)γ
τp = 1− (b+R)(γ − (1 +R)α)(1 + τ)
(1 +R)(γ + β − βb)
τw = 1− (1 + τ)c¯0 + k¯ + m¯
(1− τp)FL(k¯, 1)
T1 = (1 + τ)c¯1 − (1− τp)FK(k¯, 1)k¯
At such the steady state the goverment’s budget is kept balanced
every period.
Proof: The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for
proposition 3. 
6 Conclusion
We have presented a general equilibrium overlapping generations
model with environmental externalities from both production and
consumption. For such a model we proved that the competitive equi-
librium steady state is not the efficient steady state, for any discount
rate the social planner may use. The pollution externality from con-
sumption does not affect the range of dynamically inefficient capi-
tal ratios, whereas the pollution externality from production does.
The higher the production pollution parameter α, the larger the in-
efficient range. The environmental maintaining technology γ also
plays a role in determining the best steady state capital ratio k¯.
The cleaner the environment maintaining technology, the smaller
the range of the dynamically inefficient allocations. By comparing
the competitive steady state and the best steady state, we designed
a balanced budget taxes and transfer policy that decentralizes the
planner’s steady state.
This paper makes many simplifying assumptions, such as the
technology being exogenous, the population growth rate being zero
and there being only one production sector. Further developments
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including endogenous technology and fertility, as well as the impact
of human capital accumulation are left for future research.
Appendix
A1. Existence of the agent’s optimal solution
By substituting (10), (11), (12) and (13) into (8) and (9) the exis-
tence of solution to the system of the first order conditions (8)-(13) is
equivalent to the existence of solution to the system of two following
equations
u′(ct0)− [β(1− b) + γ]φ′(Eet+1) = 0 (97)
v′(ct1)−
β + γrt+1
β(1− b) + γ u
′(ct0) = 0 (98)
where
Eet+1 = (1− b)
[
(1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− β(ct0 + ct−11 ) + γmt−1
]
−αF (Kt+1, 1)− β(ct+1,e0 + ct1) + γ(wt − ct0 − c
t
1
rt+1
)
From (98), by implicit function theorem we can treat ct1 as a
function of ct0, ct1 = ϕ(ct0) where ϕ′(·) > 0, ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(+∞) =
+∞. We rewrite
Eet+1 = Q− [β(1− b) + γ] ct0 − (β +
γ
rt+1
)ϕ(ct0)
where Q = (1 − b) [(1− b)Et−1 − αF (kt−1, 1)− βct−11 + γmt−1] −
αF (Kt+1, 1)− βct+1,e0 + γwt. Now the system of equations (97) and
(98) leads to the following equation
u′(ct0)− [β(1− b) + γ]φ′(Q− [β(1− b) + γ] ct0 − (β +
γ
rt+1
)ϕ(ct0)) = 0 (99)
The existence of the agent’s optimal solution is equivalent to the
existence of solution to equation (99). In effect, set
4 = u′(ct0)− [β(1− b) + γ]φ′(Q− [β(1− b) + γ] ct0 − (β +
γ
rt+1
)ϕ(ct0))
is a continuous function of ct0. We have,
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lim
ct0→+∞
4 = −∞ < 0
and
lim
ct0→0+
4 = +∞ > 0
We also find that 4 is a monotone function of ct0 since
∂4
∂ct0
= u′′(ct0) + [β(1− b) + γ]
[
β(1− b) + γ + (β + γ
rt+1
)ϕ′(ct0)
]
φ′′(Eet+1) < 0
So there exists a unique solution ct0 > 0 to (99), meaning that
there exists a unique optimal solution of the agent.
A2. Competitive equilibrium dynamics
The competitive equilibrium conditions impose on (ct+10 , ct1, kt,mt, Et+1)
a dynamics described by a first-order difference equation, since
u′(ct0)− [β(1− b) + γ]φ′(Et+1) = 0
v′(ct1)−
[
β +
γ
FK(kt, 1)
]
φ′(Et+1) = 0
ct0 + k
t +mt − FL(kt−1, 1) = 0
ct1 − FK(kt, 1)kt = 0
Et+1 − (1− b)Et + αF (kt, 1) + β(ct+10 + ct1)− γmt = 0
implicitly define it to be a function of its lagged value (ct0, c
t−1
1 , k
t−1,mt−1, Et).
In effect, the associated Jacobian matrix with respect to (ct+10 , ct1, kt,mt, Et+1)
J =

0 0 0 0 G
0 v′′(ct1) D 0 H
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 −C 0 0
β β αFK(k
t, 1) −γ 1

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where
C = FK(k
t, 1) + FKK(k
t, 1)kt = θ2A(kt)θ−1 > 0
D =
γFKK(k
t, 1)
FK(kt, 1)2
φ′(Et+1) < 0
G = − [β(1− b) + γ]φ′′(Et+1) > 0
H = −
[
β +
γ
FK(kt, 1)
]
φ′′(Et+1) > 0
is regular, since
det(J) = G
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 v′′(ct1) D 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 −C 0
β β αFK(k
t, 1) −γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −Gβ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
v′′(ct1) D 0
0 1 1
1 −C 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −Gβ (D + Cv′′(ct1)) > 0
Since, the Jacobian matrix is regular for all (ct+10 , ct1, kt,mt, Et+1)
then it is evidently regular at the solution. This implies that for all
competitive equilibrium (ct+10 , ct1, kt,mt, Et+1)t there exists, for all t,
a function ψ : R5 → R5 such that
ct+10
ct1
kt
mt
Et+1
 = ψ

ct0
ct−11
kt−1
mt−1
Et

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A3. Checking the SOCs for the maximization problem of
the agent
For the FOCs to be sufficient conditions to characterize a (local)
maximum to the optimization problem, we have to check the suffi-
cient SOCs. The Lagrangian of the maximization problem is
Z = u(ct0) + v(c
t
1) + φ(Et+1) + λ1(c
t
0 + k
t +mt − wt) + λ2(ct1 − rt+1kt)
+λ3
(
Et − (1− b)Et−1 + αF (kt−1, 1) + β(ct0 + ct−11 )− γmt−1
)
+λ4
(
Et+1 − (1− b)Et + αF (kt, 1) + β(ct+1,e0 + ct1)− γmt
)
whose bordered Hessian will appear as
H¯ =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 −rt+1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 β 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 β 0 −γ b− 1 1
1 0 β 0 u′′(ct0) 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 β 0 v′′(ct1) 0 0 0 0
1 −rt+1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 −γ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 b− 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 φ′′(Et+1)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
The sufficient SOCs for a maximum are
(−1)5 ˛˛H¯5 ˛˛ = −
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 −rt+1 0 0
0 0 0 0 β 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 β 0 −γ b− 1
1 0 β 0 u′′(ct0) 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 β 0 v′′(ct1) 0 0 0
1 −rt+1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 −γ 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 b− 1 0 0 0 0 0
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛
= − (β(1− b) + γ)2 r2t+1v′′(ct1)− (βrt+1 + γ)2 u′′(ct0) > 0
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(−1)6 ˛˛H¯6 ˛˛ =
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 −rt+1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 β 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 β 0 −γ b− 1 1
1 0 β 0 u′′(ct0) 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 β 0 v′′(ct1) 0 0 0 0
1 −rt+1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 −γ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 b− 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 φ′′(Et+1)
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
= r2t+1v
′′(ct1)u
′′(ct0) + φ
′′(Et+1)
∣∣H¯5∣∣ > 0
which guarantees that the solution to the agent’s problem is a max-
imum indeed.
A4. Solving the problem of the social planner
The Lagrange function for this problem is
L =
+∞∑
t=0
1
(1 +R)t
[
u(ct0) + u(c
t
1) + φ(Et+1)
]
+
+∞∑
t=0
µt
(1 +R)t
[
F (kt−1, 1)− ct0 − ct−11 − kt −mt
]
+
+∞∑
t=0
ηt
(1 +R)t
[
Et+1 − (1− b)Et + αF (kt, 1) + β(ct+10 + ct1)− γmt
]
The FOCs of the maximization problem are
∂L
∂ctt
=
u′(ct0)
(1 +R)t
− µt
(1 +R)t
+
βηt−1
(1 +R)t−1
= 0
∂L
∂ct1
=
v′(ct1)
(1 +R)t
− µt+1
(1 +R)t+1
+
βηt
(1 +R)t
= 0
∂L
∂Et+1
=
φ′(Et+1)
(1 +R)t
+
ηt
(1 +R)t
− ηt+1(1− b)
(1 +R)t+1
= 0
∂L
∂kt
= − µt
(1 +R)t
+
µt+1FK(k
t, 1)
(1 +R)t+1
+
ηtαFK(k
t, 1)
(1 +R)t
= 0
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∂L
∂mt
= − µt
(1 +R)t
− ηtγ
(1 +R)t
= 0
that is to say
u′(ct0)− µt +
βηt−1
1 +R
= 0
v′(ct1)−
µt+1
1 +R
+ βηt = 0
φ′(Et+1) + ηt − ηt+1(1− b)
1 +R
= 0
−µt + µt+1FK(k
t, 1)
1 +R
+ ηtαFK(k
t, 1) = 0
−µt − ηtγ = 0
At the steady state,
u′(c¯0) = µ− βη(1 +R)
v′(c¯1) =
µ
1 +R
− βη
φ′(E¯) = −η + (1− b)η
1 +R
FK(k¯, 1) =
µ(1 +R)
µ+ αη(1 +R)
µ = −ηγ
Therefore,
u′(c¯0) = (1 +R)
γ + β(1 +R)
b+R
φ′(E¯)
v′(c¯1) =
γ + β(1 +R)
b+R
φ′(E¯)
FK(k¯, 1) =
γ(1 +R)
γ − (1 +R)α
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